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REFLECTIONS ON WISCONSIN'S BROWN
EXPERIENCE
PHOEBE WEAVER WILLIAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION

Numerous academic, civic, legal, and media organizations designated
the year 2004, the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,' as an appropriate time to commemorate

the Supreme

Court's decision.2

Reviews

of the considerable

commentary generated by Brown's fiftieth anniversary suggest that the

occasion has represented more than an opportunity to celebrate a
momentous decision that redefined relationships between African and
European Americans in this country. Brown's fiftieth anniversary has

been an opportunity to review social, political, and legal relationships
between blacks and whites, and also other ethnic groups.
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Selected commentary documenting commemorations at academic institutions include
the following: Peter C. Alexander, Special Feature, The Fiftieth Anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education: From Brown to Topeka to the Future, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 219 (2004)(S. Ill.
U., Carbondale); Gary Blasi, Fifty Years after Brown v. Board. Five Principlesfor Moving
Ahead, in SYMPOSIUM, REKINDLING THE SPIRIT OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 6
AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 242; 11 ASIAN L. J. 324; 15 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 115; 19
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 443; Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of
Education, in SYMPOSIUM: 50 YEARS OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 90 VA. L. REV.

1693 (2004); John C. Brittain, From Brown to Grutter: Racial Integration and the Law: A
Look at Brown v. Board of Education in 2054, 3 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 29, 29 n.1 (2004). See
also 2003-2004 STATE BAR OF TEXAS SECTION REPORTS, 67 TEX. B.J. 570, 584 (2004)
(documenting commemoration by the Education Law Section).
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Brown's anniversary has prompted reviews of the legal precedent
and legislative reforms evolving from the Court's decision. Of most
import, Brown's anniversary has prompted re-examinations of the
principles the Court set forth in light of present concerns that there
remains much work to do to repair the vestiges of European
enslavement of Africans; to address the effects of past and present racial
oppression and discrimination against African Americans; and to
address current disparities between African and European Americans'
access to economic and educational opportunities.
The complexity of long relationship is similar whether it is the
interaction of individuals or divided cultures. Just as relatively little can
be learned about a couple's relationship-their successes, failures,
challenges, or accomplishments-from peering at fifty-year-old wedding
pictures, relatively little can be appreciated about the import of Brown,
its relationship to our nation's social, moral, educational, political, and
legal structure, by focusing solely on the words the Court announced on
May 17, 1954.
During the past fifty years, our national relationship with Brown has
included both adherence and infidelities to Brown's principles. As our
relationship with Brown has matured, the case and its principles remain
for some a beautiful symbol of moral courage, while for others Brown
has grown old and unattractive.3 Some note that Brown has been
reinterpreted and given so many legal "facelifts" that its principles are
hardly recognizable.4 Whatever the viewpoint, for most people, Brown
3. Dennis J Hutchinson, Perspectives on Brown, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 43, 43 n.3 (2004)
(discussing opinions about the significance of Brown and noting that twenty-five years later,
Prof. J. Harvie Wilkinson characterized Brown as "'among the most humane moments in our
history,"' while Richard Posner has acknowledged that Brown was a "'triumph of enlightened
social policy' in the short term, but in a 'longer perspective.., the decision seems much less
important, even marginal"') (quoting Richard Posner, Appeal and Consent, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, 36, 39); Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About
ConstitutionalTheory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1544 (2004) (concluding that while it would take
a decade, passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act to secure
Brown's "canonical status," the Court's decision changed constitutional doctrine so that
"supporting segregation meant advocating policies that had been declared outside the law");
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 20-28 (2004) (concluding that a decision, which

upheld "separate but equal" and required equalization of the schools, restructuring of school
boards to include black representation, and judicial oversight of remedial measures, would
have resulted in the implementation of more effective educational policies for black children).
4. Balkin, supra note 3, at 1564-67 (describing the various Supreme Court
reinterpretations of Brown: by 1964 the Court had interpreted Brown as requiring strict
scrutiny of racial classifications; by 1968 the Court had imposed an affirmative duty on school
systems to eliminate all vestiges of prior discrimination; by 1971 states were required to
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has mattered.
Almost immediately after its issuance, Brown evoked controversy
In some regions of the country, opposition was so strong that some
feared Brown would irreparably rupture relationships between the
federal judiciary and state and local governments, and between regions
of the country that proclaimed racially egalitarian ideals and those that
adhered to white supremacist beliefs.6 Part II of this Article discusses
black-white racial relations in Milwaukee and Wisconsin communities
during the era prior to Brown. Wisconsin's reactions to the Brown
racially integrate schools; by 1974 the Court interpreted Brown as requiring proof of either
overt racial classifications or deliberate intentions to segregate for remedial measures-a
decision that accelerated the resegregation of schools. In a line of affirmative action cases the
Court interpreted the antidiscrimination principle in Brown as subjecting "all overt racial
classifications to strict scrutiny whether they harmed blacks or whites").
5. Neil G. Williams, Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later: What Makes for
Greatnessin a Legal Opinion?, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 177, 183 (2004) (describing controversy
generated among African Americans about the use of the Clark studies and "Brown's
assumption that black institutions are inherently inferior"); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, An
HistoricalNote on the Significance of the Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark, 48 ST.
LouIs L. J. 991, 992, 998-99 (2004) (concluding that constitutional law scholars have "praised,
criticized, and defended the logic and outcome of Brown" since the late 1950's and discussing
African American ambivalence about the Brown decision).
6. See Thomas J. Davis, Vouching for Vouchers? Zelman v. Simmons-Harrisin Light of
Lessons on Ends and Means From Brown v. Board of Education, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L.
REV. 31, 82-83 (2004) (describing the reactions of Virginia Governor Thomas Stanley to
Brown:
In June 1954, Virginia Governor Thomas Stanley defiantly declared in
response to Brown I, "I shall use every legal means at my command to
continue segregated schools in Virginia." In August 1954, Governor
Stanley further declared that: "The people of Virginia and their elected
representatives, are confronted with the gravest problems since 1865.
Beginning with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on
May 17, 1954, there has been a series of events striking at the very
fundamentals of constitutional government and creating situations of the
utmost concern to all of our people in this Commonwealth, and
throughout the South."... In August 1956 the governor convened a
special session of the Virginia General Assembly to treat the state's public
school laws in light of the Brown desegregation mandates. The legislature
responded with a contumacious anti-desegregation package of thirteen
acts described as "massive resistance" laws. They included interposition,
a theory arguing on Tenth Amendment grounds that within its limits a
state may declare null and void U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The acts
also purported to authorize the governor and other state officials to cut
off state funding to, and actually close, any schools that integrated.
Further, the legislature authorized tuition grants for children whose
parents wished to send them to alternative schools to avoid integration.
Id. (citations omitted)).
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decision are discussed in Part III.
A review of the litigation inspired by Brown's principles and the

legislative reforms necessitated to enforce them demonstrates that
Brown transcended the Court's May 1954 holding that "separate but
equal has no place in public school education."7 Many viewed the

Court's holding as setting forth the principle that "separate but equal"
has no place in numerous spheres of black-white interactions.8
Acknowledging that the importance and relevance of Brown
measured far beyond the immediate effects of the Court's decision,
Marquette University Law School sponsored two conferences that
encouraged retrospective, as well as prospective, examinations of

Wisconsin's relationship with the Court's historic opinion.

The first

conference, entitled, Segregation and Resegregation: Wisconsin's
Unfinished Experience, Brown's Legacy After 50 Years, undertook a

retrospective examination of the Court's decision. That perspective,
along with the personal reflections it generated, is the focus of this
article. Conference planners encouraged individuals to reflect on
Brown by posing questions that sought a broad range of observations,
including the following: (1) What was the community like, before and
after Brown?; (2) What was the impact of the news of desegregation
because of Brown?; and (3) What changes came with the court's 1976
order to desegregate Milwaukee's public schools?
In addition, the conference considered the delayed arrival of school
desegregation in Milwaukee Public Schools. Part III of this Article
considers the impact of the news of desegregation on the Milwaukee
7. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. For a discussion of how subsequent legislation was influenced
by Brown's principles, see Balkin, supra note 3, at 1548-49 (using positive constitutional
theory to explain how direct action, the Brown decision, and subsequent legislation such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which "placed Congress's seal of approval on Brown," the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, which enfranchised a large number of African Americans residing
in the south, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which distributed funds to
local school districts and placed the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which the
1964 Civil Rights Act gave the power to withhold funds in a "key position to influence
desegregation efforts").
8. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text. See also Hon. Constance Baker
Motley, Standing on His Shoulders: Thurgood Marshall'sEarly Career,1991 HOW. L. J. 23, 27
n.14 (1991) (concluding that Brown led to a series of cases in the decade 1954-1964 where the
Supreme Court struck down racial segregation in other public or publicly aided facilities)
(citing Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (court houses); Watson v. City of Memphis,
373 U.S. 526 (1963) (public parks, playgrounds); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350
(1962) (municipally-owned airport restaurant); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(public golf courses); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) (hospitals); Dawson v. City of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1955), afftd, 350 U.S. 877 (public beaches)).
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and Wisconsin communities, drawing on personal and public reflections
on the Court's decision by legal counselors and community leaders who
participated.
Across geographical regions, responses to the Court's decision
varied. Differences in racial demographics and racial customs, along
with variations in formal legal landscapes, influenced public reactions to
Brown. However, to date the legal commentary has not addressed
Wisconsin's response to the Brown decision in light of Wisconsin's legal,

social, and political landscape. Milwaukee's response was a mirror of a
nation still mired in a fierce and costly blight; its responses were, and
continue to be, uniquely its own. Part III of this Article fills this void
through a discussion of Wisconsin's response to Brown in light of the
legal, social, and political frameworks that formed Wisconsin's blackwhite relationships.
Our national relationship to Brown represents more than a time-

bound response to the Court's first decision outlawing legal racial
segregation in public education. We, as a nation, have extended
Brown's legal principles to other spheres of public and private activities
where racial segregation was sanctioned by law and perpetuated by
facially neutral governmental policies.9 We have developed the courts'
tools to address de jure racial segregation and racial inequity, though the

problems before the judges arise from complex social issues.' °
Many scholars have written about legal and cultural dilemmas, and
more recently Wisconsin's educational reforms have been subject to
examination." Yet, the legal literature lacks sufficient discussions of
9. Brittain, supra note 2, at 31 (describing the positive impact of Brown as ending "de
jure segregation not only in education, but also in transportation and accommodations in
hotels, restaurants, and shops.")
10. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleishcher, Comparing Remedies for School Desegregation
and Employment Discrimination:Can Employers Now Help Schools?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1695, 1698 (2004) (comparing the remedial structure of Title VI and Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the author concludes that Title VII's remedial structure led to greater
integration of workplaces than Title VI's remedial structure, which relied only upon the
withdrawal of federal funds from racially discriminatory educational institutions).
11. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1706 (responding to Professor Gerald Rosenberg's
conclusions that "Brown 'had virtually no direct effect on ending discrimination' and that
change occurred only 'when Congress and the executive branch acted in tandem with the
courts"'). Tushnet concludes that Rosenberg's analysis "misses one important way in which
Brown matters: as part of a long-term collaboration between the Supreme Court and the New
Deal (and later the Great Society) political coalition." Id. at 1694. Tushnet further explains
that "Brown was the first indication from the very top of one of the nation's major
governmental institutions that the civil rights leaders' appeal to the constitution might
actually have some resonance-not only with the leaders and their constituencies, but with a
broader public." Id. at 1708.
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Wisconsin's Brown experience in light of these broader themes.
This Article addresses that void. In Wisconsin, Brown and its
progeny evoked both laudable and critical responses of the Court's

underlying assumptions and ensuing contributions to constitutional law
and educational policy. Brown emboldened civil rights activists to
pursue housing legislation to break patterns of neighborhood racial
segregation. 2 Brown's principles encouraged critiques of state laws that

pronounced state policies that race should not play a role in
employment decisions, but provided no enforcement powers for either
governmental or private litigants."

Brown inspired challenges to

educational policies that perpetuated and sustained racially segregated
school systems in Milwaukee.'

Nevertheless, the critiques of Brown's

underlying assumptions about the necessity and efficacy for integrated
schools to deliver quality education produced the greatest impact in
Wisconsin."
Those critiques led to unique and far-reaching
6
experiments. Wisconsin's experiences with those reforms subsequently
influenced national educational policies. 7
Part IV concludes that, whatever opinion one holds of Brown, the
Court's decision surely transcended the geographical, temporal, and
legal transactions addressed by its opinions. Brown reached past 1950's
educational policies, beyond southern mores and biases, into the very
12. See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
15. Howard L. Fuller, The Impact of the Milwaukee Public School System's
Desegregation Plan on Black Students and the Black Community (1976-1982), 10, 148-55
(May 1985) (unpublished dissertation) (on file with the author) (discussing Brown I & II and
the subsequent desegregation measures used in Milwaukee schools-school closings, magnet
schools, busing, and dislocation of students from neighborhood schools). Fuller concludes
Brown was not based on racist tenets of black inferiority. Id. at 156. Nevertheless,
desegregation was implemented in Milwaukee based on assumptions that "black schools and
communities were 'culturally inferior"' and, therefore, unsuitable for white children. Id. at
160.
16. See generally Alison Barnes, The Conundrum of Segregation's Ending: The
Education Choices, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 33 (2005).
17. Davis, supra note 6, at 39-40 (explaining that vouchers in Ohio represented grants of
taxpayer money to "parents of elementary school children based on their financial need
measured by family income" and noting that the "school voucher struggles began with a
program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1990" with Ohio implementing its program in 1996,
Florida in 1999, Texas and Louisiana legislatures considering vouchers during 2002 and 2003
and Colorado enacting a school voucher statute in April 2003; commenting further that
"[a]nalysts such as Kathy Christie at the Education Commission on the States in Denver
expect voucher programs to gain acceptance and popularity under President George W.
Bush's No Child Left Behind Initiative of 2001 that requires states to increase standardized
testing and assessments of students").

2005]

WISCONSIN'S BROWN EXPERIENCE

heart of Wisconsin's progressive political tradition. In some respect,
Brown has mattered to most Wisconsin's residents, black and white,
urban and rural, and surely to newer minority citizens.
Reflections from Wisconsin residents suggest that Wisconsin's
Brown experience has mirrored our national experience in many ways.
It has included a mix of public and private responses to the Court's
decision demonstrating adherence to Brown's moral mandate and
resistance to Brown's principles. Our relationship to the Court's
opinions has been just as complex as our national relationship to race.
As Wisconsin's Brown experience evolved, new challenges have
emerged of increasing complexity. As African Americans and other
racial groups successfully asserted rights and claims, public and private
responses to those claims have eventually reflected majority preferences
to segregate and exclude despite legal successes in courts and political
successes in legislatures. Still, African Americans in Wisconsin persist
with reevaluating positions and reframing arguments. Wisconsin's
Brown experience has been tumultuous and not always happy, but like
the relationship of Brown to the rest of the country, it endures.
II. WISCONSIN'S STANCE ON RACE PRIOR TO BROWN: FROM 18461946: A CENTURY OF "WEAK RACIAL LIBERALISM"' 8

Although Northern states were "virulently racist" during the
antebellum period,'9 residents in midwestern states were particularly
hostile towards black rights, with
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa barring
20
1850s.
the
during
migration
black
Compared to most states, Wisconsin was progressive on racial issues;
the majority of Wisconsin residents accepted only limited formal racial
equality, applied and interpreted in a manner consistent with prevailing
racist mores. While over one hundred petitions to the Wisconsin
legislature after the Emancipation Proclamation sought to prevent
Negroes from becoming residents, 21 no such exclusionary legislation
appeared in Wisconsin.
In 1866, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that African
18. JOSEPH A. RANNEY,

TRUSTING NOTHING To PROVIDENCE:

A HISTORY OF

WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM 540 (1999).

19. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1888 (1995).

20. Id. at 1889.
21. EDWARD NOYES, THE NEGRO IN WISCONSIN'S CIVIL WAR EFFORT 70-71 (1967).
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Americans were entitled to vote, Wisconsin became one of only six
states in the nation to grant black suffrage.22 The achievement was not
without long work, and this symbol of racial progress came after two
decades of initiatives by black residents and white supporters. 23 During
the 1846 State Constitutional Convention, a majority of the delegates
rejected proposals to include black suffrage in the state's constitution.4
At the 1847-48 Convention, delegates ratified language granting
suffrage to "white male persons, over the age of twenty-one years, who
have resided in this state one year next preceding any election, and who
are citizens of the United States or have declared their intentions to
become citizens, and also certain persons of Indian blood., 21 Most
notably, the delegates included a proviso that permitted the legislature
to extend suffrage to those persons not already enumerated in the
constitution.26 However, the state constitution required a referendum
vote for approval by "a majority of all the votes cast at such election."27
Wisconsin's first legislature passed a black suffrage law authorizing a
referendum that was submitted to a vote during 1849.28 Voters approved
the law by a vote of 5265 to 4075.29 However, the number who voted to
approve black suffrage represented fewer than half of all of the voters
who cast ballots in the election, which included voting on other matters
such as persons running for office.'
Therefore, it was "universally
understood" that the voters had failed to pass the legislation permitting
black suffrage.31 During subsequent terms, the legislature passed
suffrage laws in 1857 and 1865, but voters in those referenda clearly
rejected black suffrage.32
Issues of black rights predated the founding of the state and the
writing of its constitution.3 3 Wisconsin is reputed to have "never
countenanced de jure" racial discrimination, but state constitutional
supra note 18, at 540 n.8.
See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
RANNEY, supra note 18, at 536.
Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544, 552 (1866) (citing WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1).
Id. at 552.
Id.
RANNEY, supra note 18, at 537.
Gillespie, 20 Wis. at 544 (describing prior history of the case).

22. RANNEY,

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30. Id.
31. RANNEY, supra note 18, at 537.

32. Id.
33. RANNEY, supra note 18, at 536 (noting that at the time of statehood "Wisconsinites
detested slavery, but they also felt that blacks were inferior to whites and they had no desire
to integrate").
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provisions affording suffrage rights to "white" residents represented a
racially discriminatory legal mandate.
In response to de jure racial
discrimination enshrined in Wisconsin's Constitution, black Wisconsin
residents were forced to employ a number of strategies to secure
suffrage rights. They successfully pursued legislative reform not once,
but three times.35 Initially, they garnered sufficient political support to
approve the law during the 1849 referendum. 6 However, those
measures were not sufficient because election officials applied a "forced
and unnatural"3 interpretation to language in the state's constitution.
Blacks again successfully pursued legislative proposals during the 1857
and 1865 sessions, but voter referenda rejected the suffrage legislation.38
Wisconsin's black residents finally decided on a direct action
strategy that created a factual basis for litigation to challenge local
officials' interpretations of the outcome of the 1849 referendum. 9
Ezekiel Gillespie, a black leader in Milwaukee, attempted to register to
vote and cast a ballot in the 1865 election.40 Local election inspectors
rejected Gillespie's registration and denied him the opportunity to
vote.4 ' Gillespie sued to challenge his exclusion in litigation before
Wisconsin's Supreme Court, which concluded that Wisconsin's black
residents had been eligible to vote since the 1849 referendum.
These events surrounding black residents' pursuit of suffrage rights
set the stage for the state's response to black civil rights initiatives.
Delay could be gained by offering weak formal protections that could be
easily frustrated, thereby accommodating racist sentiments.
Why were black residents singled out and subjected to such
treatment? Many of Wisconsin's white residents embraced sentiments,
shared nationwide, that "racial differences were natural, the supremacy
of the white race self-evident, and racial segregation [was] an imperative
34. Id. at 540, 561 (concluding that Wisconsin "never countenanced de jure
discrimination, but de facto segregation and discrimination were common;" also noting that
"[legal discrimination against blacks disappeared with the suffrage decision"). See supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
35. RANNEY, supranote 18, at 537.
36. Id.
37. Gillespie, 20 Wis. at 556.
38. RANNEY, supranote 18, at 537.

39. Id. at 538 (describing Gillespie's motives for attempting to register to vote as
"partly" at the suggestion of his attorney, Byron Paine, to test the effects of the 1849 election
and also to publicize the suffrage issue).
40. Gillespie, 20 Wis. at 544.
41. Id.
42. RANNEY, supra note 18, at 538.
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for the survival of both races."43 Edward Ryan, a legislative delegate
who would later join Wisconsin's Supreme Court, argued against
including black suffrage in the state constitution, stating that "'it was not
right to mingle together two races whom God had declared could not
mingle."" Another delegate, Moses Strong of Mineral Point, described
white sentiments in his district when he warned black suffrage
supporters that if such a clause was included in the constitution, "the
people would deem it an infringement upon their natural rights thus to
place them upon an equality with the colored race." 5
Black Wisconsin residents confronted a pattern of recognition of
rights of formal racial equality, only to find those rights thwarted by
racist customs and beliefs, misunderstandings, and lack of enforcement
mechanisms when asserting their rights across a range of social, civil,
and political activities including voting, using public accommodations,
and securing employment, housing, and quality educations for their
children. Legal historian Joseph Ranney has characterized Wisconsin's
attitude towards black civil rights from 1846 to 1866 as representing a
form of "weak racial liberalism" that "continued for the next century."" 6
Discussions here illustrate that the pattern of "weak racial liberalism"
was the prevailing political response to Wisconsin's black residents'
efforts to secure equal access to the benefits of citizenship, gainful
employment, and property ownership.
Wisconsin's experiences with enacting and enforcing its early civil
rights laws further demonstrate patterns of formal promises of equality
followed by retrenchments to positions that permitted expressions of
racial preferences and animus to continue. During 1889, for example, a
theatre owner attempted to escort a black patron to racially segregated
balcony seats.'
In response, about seventy-five black Milwaukeeans
held an "indignation meeting" at which they formed a committee whose
43. Klarman, supra note 19, at 1895 (describing the "intellectual backdrop" supporting
mid-nineteenth century views on black-white race relations).
44. RANNEY, supra note 18, at 536-37 (quoting MADISON EXPRESS, Oct. 27, 1846,
reprintedin MILO M. QUAIFE, THE CONVENTION OF 1846 243-44 (1919)).

45. RANNEY, supra note 18, at 537 (quoting QUAIFE, supra note 44, at 214-15).
46. Id. at 540.
47. Id. at 535, 540-42 (citing to circumstances surrounding suffrage, enforcement of
Wisconsin's fair employment laws, residential segregation and school integration
controversies as inconsistencies between Wisconsin's reputation as a progressive state and
racial realities).
48. JOE

WILLIAM TROTTER

JR.,

BLACK

MILWAUKEE:

THE

MAKING OF AN

INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT 1915-45, 25 (1985) (describing events that led to the Wisconsin
Civil Rights Act of 1895).
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purpose was to take the proprietor to court.49 Within months, the
committee became a permanent organization, the Wisconsin Union
League, the goals of which were to prosecute the court case and develop
plans to secure passage of a state civil rights bill."° The litigation was
successful. The circuit court ruling, announced in May 1890, held that a
person could not be excluded from equal access to places of public
amusement on the grounds of race, color, or prior condition of
servitude."1
The Union League group persisted with their efforts. Wisconsin's
only black attorney, William T. Green,52 drafted a comprehensive civil
rights bill to present to the state legislature. 3 That bill required that all
places of accommodation and amusement must be open to the public
regardless of race, and violators would be charged with a misdemeanor
carrying fines from $25 to $500 and/or imprisonment for up to one
year. 4 That measure failed to pass the Democratic controlled 1891
legislature, however. When Republicans returned to office three years
later, a new measure was introduced with reduced fines and penalties of
$5 to $100 and/or six months in jail. 6 That measure passed in 1895,
resulting in Wisconsin's first Civil Rights Law. 7
The pattern of steps forward and backward continued nevertheless.
As the enforcement of that legislation is described by historian Joe
William Trotter, "[j]udges usually imposed such lenient penalties, the
lowest allowed by law, that the color line in public accommodations and
amusements continued." 8 Politicians could announce they had again
attempted to meet the concerns of black residents with an amended
version of Wisconsin's Public Accommodations Act. However, due to
weak enforcement, patterns of racial exclusion, harassment, and
discrimination could continue with relatively little cost to its
perpetrators. 9
49. Id. at 26.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. TROTTER, supra note 48, at 103 (noting that William T. Green died in 1911 and left
the city without a practicing black attorney).
53. Id. at 26.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

59. C.f MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 49 (2004) (concluding that the national
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I with blacks

increasingly being denied "access to theaters, restaurants, health
services, recreational facilities, and a variety of other amenities and
necessities. ' 6° Trotter concluded that Wisconsin's Civil Rights Law was
subverted through various devices: "harassment, outright refusal of
service, poor service, and overcharging."61 Restaurants and theaters
blatantly discriminated against Milwaukee's black patrons.
For

example, the Butterfly Theater refused to sell black patrons tickets and
informed them the theatre was not "'catering to Colored patrons,' or
that the house was 'sold out.' 62 The Davidson theatre during 1919
offered black patrons segregated seating in the balcony. 63
Blacks and their white allies urged the legislature to pass provisions
that improved the 1895 Law, and in 1931, the legislature responded by

clarifying some terms and prohibitions, specifically forbidding the
practice of overcharging black customers as a means of discouraging

their patronage and prohibiting discrimination in the sale of auto
insurance.64 Trotter notes that some blacks brought suit under the law's
provisions and prevailed, but certainly many lacked financial resources

to pursue litigation.65
Racially discriminatory denials to places of amusement, while
important, were likely overshadowed by racially discriminatory denials

of employment opportunities.
Trotter notes that many African
Americans joined the Milwaukee industrial workforce during the busy
production years of World War 1.66 In a heated economy, conflicts with
other workers over jobs were diminished.67
public accommodation law of 1875 "was essentially a dead letter before the Court invalidated
it in 1883, and so were public accommodations laws passed in southern states during
Reconstruction;" adding "[e]ven public accommodations laws in northern states had proved
inconsequential in practice. Many blacks were intimidated out of exercising their statutory
rights to equal access, and those who insisted on their rights were often rebuffed, sometimes
violently. Most blacks whose rights were violated were too poor to sue.").
60. Id. at 116.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 117.
63. Id.
64. TROTrER, supra note 48, at 117; RANNEY, supra note 18, at 541 (noting the
legislative expansion of the civil rights law to cover auto insurance sales).
65. TROTTER, supra note 48, at 117.
66. Id. at 151.
67. Id. at 44-45 (noting the "curtailment of European immigration, destructive
conditions in southern agriculture ... , industrial recruitment campaigns, the lure of higher
wages in northern industries, and favorable press comment (especially during the war) from
both black and whites encouraged the flow" of migration; discussing examples of press
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During the Depression, in contrast, those gains were "arrested" and
"temporarily reversed." '
A 1933 survey by the Milwaukee Urban
League of 351 black workers revealed that 54.6% were unemployed.69
The U.S. Census of 1940 reveals stark disparities in unemployment
between whites and blacks with 29.3% of black males seeking work
compared to 12.7% of white males in the same work category. 0
One explanation for disproportionately high black unemployment
was racial discrimination practiced by unions. Trotter notes: "When
blacks sought to gain employment in the breweries during the early
1930s, employers uniformly pointed to union opposition as the basis for
black exclusion., 71 Racial stereotypes about blacks' abilities caused
certain large industrial employers to offer black hires employment only
to perform hot and difficult jobs, including foundry work. Relief from
high levels of black unemployment occurred only with World War II,
after "the manpower needs of war plants and the military draft depleted
white supplies of labor."7 3
Thus, by 1942-1943, heavy industry
employers actually sought black employees. 4
Even in circumstances of such need for workers, however, black
employment in Milwaukee's industrial defense plants occurred only
after "a vigorous campaign against both the racist hiring practices of
employers and the discriminatory policies of labor unions."75 The
federal government, backing the war effort, stepped in. During 1941,
"President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which
established a Fair Employment Practices Committee [FEPC] to work
against job bias in government and defense industries" and prohibited
racially discriminatory employment practices by defense contractors.76
Local black leaders Attorney James Dorsey, President of the National

accounts encouraging black migration).
68. Id. at 151.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 152.
72. Id. at 152-54.
73. Id. at 165.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 166.
76. Id.; see also Theodore M. Shaw, The Race Convention and Civil Rights in the United
States, 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 19, 21 n.10 (1999-2000) (citing to the following language in the
Fair Employment Practices Act, Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 125 (June 27, 1941): "All
contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense
contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to
discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin.").
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Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), and
Williams Kelley, Executive Director of the Milwaukee Urban League,
gathered affidavits from black workers alleging racially discriminatory
practices by Milwaukee firms that performed federal defense work
contracts.77
Appearing at hearings in Chicago before the FEPC, the NAACP
and the Milwaukee Urban League successfully presented cases against
78
The evidence established that the firms
five Milwaukee companies.
refused to employ blacks and Jews. The firms issued restrictive work
orders to public and private employment agencies where they sought
"only white or only Gentile" workers.79 Testimony from the few black
workers hired alleged that their employers confined them to jobs such as
"porters, janitors, and common laborers." 8
The FEPC ordered those companies to "accept applicants for all
classifications of employment without regard to race, color, creed or
national origin,",81 warning that if they failed to comply they could incur
claims of contract violations, fines, or suspension of their defense
contracts. 82 It required the convergence of federal policies and orders,
acute labor shortages, and pressure from blacks and their white allies to
compel Milwaukee industrial firms to reform their racist policies and
employ blacks in larger numbers. 3
The segregation of schools was a microcosm of the broader
experiences of racial exclusion, involving differences in resources,
curriculum, and teaching faculty. Black Milwaukeeans encountered
decades of racially exclusionary barriers when seeking teaching
positions with Milwaukee Public Schools ("MPS")." The barriers were
much more difficult to overcome than barriers in the defense industry
because no federal orders backed black advocates' claims.
Changes in the proportion of and opportunities for black Milwaukee

77. TROTFER, supra note 48, at 166.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 166-67.
80. Id. at 167.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 168, 173 (noting also that the Congress of Industrial Organizations ("CIO"), in
contrast to the American Federation of Labor unions, organized black workers and
developed a rapport with the black community).
84. See infra notes 90-123 and accompanying text (noting campaigns to secure
employment for black teachers beginning in 1928 and continuing past 1953).
85. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
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citizens created inner city schools defined by racist segregation. The
relatively recent influx of African Americans in search of jobs and
opportunities created a concentrated, but not exclusive, population. By
the late 1930s, over 92% of Milwaukee's 7500 black residents
(representing just 1.3% of the city's population) lived in a 120 block
impoverished area that was known as Milwaukee's "Near Northside."8' 6
However, due to their relatively small representation in the city, this
residential segregation had not resulted in an all black community.
Nevertheless, "nearly all black children [residing in Milwaukee]
attended either Fourth Street or Ninth Street Elementary" schools.87
Both schools "had racially mixed student bodies [that enrolled] between
35 to 50% black students in the early 1930s." ' So, when William Kelley
and his colleagues assessed the situation during 1928, they concluded,
"school segregation was not the issue."8 9 Rather, the problem was that
there was not a "single black teacher in the Milwaukee public school
system." 9 All the teachers of black children were white.
These community leaders began the first black educational reform
movement in Wisconsin identifying and defining jobs for black teachers
as the leading reform issue for inner city Milwaukee education. 9' The
agenda persisted undisturbed for the next thirty years. 2 Admittedly,
benefits could be derived from obtaining employment for black teachers
with MPS 93 and also for black children who could respect them as role
models. Public schools offered employment opportunities for black
middle class professional teachers, and these teachers assisted with
addressing the "many complaints about white teachers' low expectations

86. JACK DOUGHERTY, MORE THAN ONE STRUGGLE: THE EVOLUTION OF BLACK
SCHOOL REFORM IN MILWAUKEE 11 (2004) (examining the history of educational reform in

Milwaukee). Dr. Dougherty concludes that "there is more than one story to be told" about
the history of black education and viewing that history "solely through the lens of Brown
distorts our understanding of the past" that included "struggles for numerous reforms: hiring
black teachers; resettling migrant families; gaining better resources, including black curricula;
and exercising community control." Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (noting that Kelley observed on his arrival to Milwaukee during 1928 that MPS
had never employed a single black teacher).
91. See infra notes 97-123 and accompanying text. See also DOUGHERTY, supra note 86,
at 4 (identifying three periods of black activism for educational reform in Milwaukee: "black
teacher hiring of the 1930's"; "school integration in the 1950's"; and "a countermovement that
gave rise to private school vouchers in the 1990's").
92. Id.at 12.
93. Id.
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94

for black students.,
The problems of policy choice and change were difficult, however.
After analyzing how blacks in other northern cities had used their
resulting political strength from growing populations to secure
employment for black teachers, Kelley and his colleagues faced a
painful dilemma: "Should they press for a handful of black educators in
a racially mixed system, or for a greater number of black educators in a
segregated system?" 95 The answer had to include politics and principle.96
Initially, black community leaders used political connections with a
white politician running in a contested election to secure employment
for two black teachers to work at Fourth Street Elementary as day to
day substitutes-a type of work sought by teachers who desired
eligibility for full time permanent openings.'
Encouraged by this
success, during a Milwaukee School Board meeting, black community
leaders presented a resolution "'to give consideration to persons of the
colored race' when hiring teachers. 9 8 Discussions on the proposal
became heated when MPS school superintendent, Milton Potter,
surprised some school board members by acknowledging that he had
discretely hired "two black teachers during the previous election
year... in order to avoid raising the race issue." 99 In response to
charges of racial discrimination, Potter retorted, MPS "had 'never
drawn any color line' and hired teachers based solely on merit." 100
The rhetoric was indeed confused. Another school board member
argued that MPS had not hired any black teachers "because none were
qualified, adding, 'If you knew enough about the colored population
here you would know why.'"10 1
The proponent of the resolution for consideration of black applicant

94. Id. at 13 (noting William Kelley heard complaints that white teachers demonstrated
to black students their low expectations). For example, vocational counselors advised "black
boys against training in higher-level occupations on the grounds that these jobs would not be
made available to members of their race." Id.
95. Id. at 14-19 (describing how blacks in northern cities brokered their political
influence to secure teaching positions for black professionals).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 20 (describing how a black newspaper publisher offered a full page ad
supporting a local white politician who used his influence with his brother, a member of the
Milwaukee School Board, to secure employment for black teachers Susie Bazzelle and Millie
White).
98. Id. at 21 (quoting P.J. Gilmer, a black physician and Urban League member).
99. Id. at 22.
100. Id. (quoting Milton Potter).
101. Id.
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teachers responded by offering the names of recent Milwaukee State
Teachers College black graduates. Nevertheless, the Board voted
against the resolution.' °2 As a further setback, by the mid-1930s both
black teachers employed at Fourth Street had left their jobs-one due to
termination, the other because
3 of demotions from a full-time position
work.
part-time
sporadic,
"to
By 1939, William Kelley had accepted two realities: Milwaukee's
white residents were not ready for black instructors to teach their
children;' 4 and since the black student population at the Fourth Street
School had increased from 68% to 90%, Kelley reasoned that although
he thought black teachers should be hired to teach at any school in the
MPS system, the Board might agree to hire black teachers to work at
predominantly black schools.' 5 The legal reality of Kelley's position was
that there were no state fair employment laws that offered legal
protections to black applicants for teaching positions.'l 6 Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional principles were governed by Plessy's
"separate but equal"'" principle, and unlike the defense industry, black
teachers had no Executive Orders they could rely upon to bring federal
pressure on MPS.'08 So, Kelley primarily used moral persuasion, along
with appeals to white self-interests, and negotiated a compromise that
brought racially segregated school practices to MPS.
The compromise worked so that publicly the school board denied
any intentions to create racially segregated schools and announced they
intended
to pursue "merit-based
and color-blind
hiring."",

102. Id.
103. Id. (Bazzelle was dismissed "on the grounds that she was an inadequate
disciplinarian, and Millie White's full-time job was demoted to sporadic, part-time substitute
work.").
104. Id. at 26 (noting that "George Teeter, a professor at Milwaukee State Teachers
College and president of the city's Inter-Racial Council" had identified "'prejudice on the
part of white folks' against having 'Negroes teach our children' as the root of the black
teacher unemployment problem"). Cf. Brown-Nagin, supra note 5, at 999 (discussing
obstructionist measures undertaken to avoid compliance with Brown by the City of Atlanta,
Georgia Board of Education that were based on questions about the "ability of blacks to
teach whites").
105. Id. at 26-27.
106. See infra notes 128-142 (describing the lack of enforcement provisions offered by
Wisconsin's 1945 Fair Employment legislation).
107. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
108. See supra notes 76-83 (describing protections against discrimination offered by
President Roosevelt's Executive Order directed to defense industry contractors and the
measures undertaken to enforce those provisions in Milwaukee).
109. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 27.
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Nevertheless, discussions by MPS Board members demonstrated that
"race had shaped the district's behind-the-scenes negotiations" and
subsequent hiring policies." °
During the following year, the Board hired three black teachers who
By 1946,
were appointed to the two predominantly black schools.'
MPS employed five black teachers.12 MPS hiring officials also enforced
a "'gentlemen's agreement' not to hire blacks as high school teachers,"
since high school teachers had "higher-status and better-paid jobs in
school buildings that were still almost all-white in Milwaukee.""' 3
Even this limited policy proved an unrealistic and uncomfortable
search for school race policies acceptable to all. By 1951, at the request
of a high school principal, MPS had discretely appointed a black male
teacher, Thomas Cheeks, to a high school that had a 15% black
population."4 While the high school principal proudly touted the success
of Cheeks' appointment, noting he had not heard any comments from
white parents," 5 rumors circulated among black teachers that the lack of
comment may have been due to Cheeks' "very light skin complexion,"
which decreased white anxieties about his presence. 6 By 1954, MPS
employed only forty-five black 7teachers, suggesting limited success
under the tacit hiring agreement.
A new generation of activists found the city's progress lacking.
During October 1953, MPS's tacit agreement with Urban League black
leaders to confine black teachers' employment opportunities to
predominantly black elementary schools drew protests from black civil
rights activists."' Just months before the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Brown, a new generation of NAACP activists voiced

110. Id. at 27.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 28.
113. Id. at 29 (adding that blacks were denied high school teaching positions because
many whites did not believe blacks possessed the necessary intellectual skills; some saw the
exclusionary policies as an effort to avoid interracial interactions between blacks and white
adolescents).
114. Id. at 31 (describing the circumstances surrounding the hiring of Thomas Cheeks as
"an experienced black male teacher who had previously chaired a high school social studies
department in Indiana").
115. Id.
116. Id. at 31.
117. Id. at 32 (noting that by 1950 MPS employed nine black teachers and that number
had doubled again four years later); see E-mail from Sharon Jackson to author (March 30,
2004, 17:19:00 CST) (on file with the author).
118. Id. at 34.
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objections to MPS' racially restricted employment opportunities."' At
the October 1953 MPS School Board meeting, Vel Phillips, a black
female attorney who would later win election to the city council
inquired, "'Is it a mere coincidence.., that there are so many Negro
teachers at Roosevelt [Junior High School], at Ninth Street, at Fourth
Street?",120 Attorney Phillips and others asserted that schools with
predominantly black student populations had been used as "dumping
grounds" or as disciplinary assignments for white teachers. 121 An
assistant to the superintendent responded that MPS "did not keep race
records [and] [tleachers were simply assigned to schools close to their
homes[,] ...and since most blacks lived in the Near Northside, it was no
surprise that they were largely assigned to Fourth Street, Ninth Street,
and Roosevelt Junior High.' ' 122 He added, "many black teachers
123
preferred schools with predominantly black student populations.'
Other presentations reflect the pressing concerns about MPS today.
Attorney James Dorsey also confronted the Board, but his concerns
centered on the quality of education MPS offered black children. He
questioned if MPS schools "adequately prepared black youth to
compete in the labor market for high-quality jobs rather than for 'the
dirty work' handed down to them.', 125 Attorney Phillips supported
concerns raised at the meeting that some high school counselors
"'discouraged Negro youths who aspired to advanced education,'" with
an account of her own experiences with racially motivated counseling
while a student at Roosevelt Junior High School. 26 Phillips remarked
that "a faculty adviser told her that 'Negro women were best prepared
to train for cooks and maids and not to take college courses.', 1 27 The
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.at 34-35.
122. Id. at 35.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 35.
126. Id. (quoting Henry Reuss, a school board member and future Democratic
Congressman).
127. Id. Attorney Phillips also related this story to the participants at the Law School's
Brown Conference. C.f Josie Foehrenback Brown, Escaping the Circle by Confronting
Classroom Stereotyping: A Step toward Equality in the Daily Educational Experience of
Children of Color, in SYMPOSIUM: REKINDLING THE SPIRIT OF BROWN V.

BOARD

OF

supra note 2. Professor Brown concludes that "subliminally biased perceptions
continue to compromise teachers' effectiveness and children's education, and the initiation of
a systematic effort to address the issue of racial and ethnic stereotyping by teachers remains
an outstanding challenge in contemporary American schools." 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J.
EDUCATION,
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gap between policy and practice played out, making any significant
integration appear to be an ideal rather than a reality.
Although Wisconsin had a fair employment law in 1945,'2 racially
discriminatory practices in fact barred blacks from employment
opportunities. While legislation offered promise to black residents of
equal access to employment, at enactment the legislature pared
provisions so that violators were spared administrative and judicial
enforcement. 9 The 1957 case of Ross v. Ebert3" illustrated the Fair
Employment Act's shortcomings. The plaintiffs, black bricklayers,
brought suit under Wisconsin law after the Local Bricklayers Union
refused to accept their transfers from a union outside the state, citing its
policy that only white persons were eligible for membership.'
After
carefully examining the Act's language, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found that the Fair Employment Statute that announced racial
discrimination in employment was "undesirable,' 32 and the "public
policy of the state [was]
to encourage and foster employment without
'
133
such discrimination.'
However, the statute did not contain even the "slightest reference to
'require' or 'compel"' employers or unions not to discriminate.'
Certainly, the statute did not declare racial discrimination in
employment illegal.'35 Neither did it include language that gave "a
colored applicant an enforceable right to union membership over the
objection, on racial grounds, of the members already there." 136 Instead,
the statutory remedies available to those who believed they were victims
of discrimination were to complain to the State Industrial Commission,
which could only investigate, publicize its findings, and make
recommendations to the parties. 137 The commission had held a hearing
and found that the union had discriminated because of the plaintiffs'
color, publicized its findings, and recommended that the union accept
339.
128. WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31-.36 (1945).
129. Ross v. Ebert, 82 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Wis. 1957) (noting that Senate Bill No. 131
granted the industrial commission powers to order violators to cease and desist and gave
courts powers to review those orders but prior to passage those provisions were removed).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 316.
132. Id. at 317.
133. Id. at 318.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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the two plaintiffs as members.138 The court found that the commission
had carried out its responsibilities.13 9

Anticipating the frustrations that could be engendered by its
decision, the court expressed empathy with the plaintiffs' circumstances:
"We grant it is cold comfort to appellants but it is all the legislature saw
fit to provide."' 4 ° The court declined the opportunity to more explicitly
critique the wisdom of the legislators.'

Rather, the court reasoned that

the legislature must have concluded the statute's policies were better
served by "moral force, aroused by the findings, publicity, and
recommendations of the commission," rather than by granting the
commission the power to order an employer or union to comply or seek
court decrees compelling compliance with its orders.'42
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, weak or no formal
prohibitions against racial discrimination in Wisconsin resulted in
racially segregated conditions and practices that were not unlike those
experienced by African Americans living in the South.'43 Milwaukee's

real estate and housing markets were replete with practices that created
racially segregated residential areas and in turn racially segregated
neighborhood schools.'" Reflecting on conditions in Milwaukee prior to
Brown, Attorney Ross R. Kinney recalled "the greater Milwaukee
community was severely segregated racially (e.g. residences, schools)
both before and after the Brown decision.""'5 Former Milwaukee Mayor
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 319.
141. See id.
142. Id. (noting also that bills had been introduced to grant the industrial commission
the power to order violators to cease and desist and give courts the power to review and
enforce such orders; however, before passage, the bill was amended and these provisions
were removed; attempts were also made during 1955 to amend the statute to include
enforcement provisions; however, they failed).
143. TROTTER, supra note 48, at 66 (describing efforts by the Milwaukee Urban League
to persuade an employer to remove signs designating separate women's restrooms).
144. Id. at 25 (describing complaints that landlords refused to rent to black tenants and
noting racially discriminatory practices by hotels and rooming houses); id. at 71 (noting that
blacks were denied the opportunity to participate in the 1923 Garden Homes low income
project, the "first low-income housing project of its kind in the United States"); id. at 182-83
(explaining how racially restrictive covenants and "gentlemen's agreements" among white
property owners not to rent or sell to blacks outside certain geographical areas were among
the factors contributing to segregated housing for blacks in Milwaukee; racially
discriminatory lending practices exacerbated the plight of the black middle class to secure
housing).
145. Letter from Ross R. Kinney, Attorney, to author (Feb. 26, 2004) (copy on file with
the author).
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Frank P. Zeidler recalled that, prior to the Court's issuance of the
Brown decision, "[slome real estate operators engaged in 'block
busting.",146 Zeidler explained block busting occurred when real estate
agents informed "white property owners on a street or on a block that
147
African American owners would be purchasing or renting a house.'
This information would "depress real estate prices and values" because
some white owners "immediately [sold] at a reduced price after which
the property... [was] sold to an African American owner for a much
higher price.' ' 1 8 Zeidler attributed "white flight" to block busting
practices that were prevalent on the "Old West Side" and "German
North Side" of Milwaukee.1 49 He also attributed higher concentrations
of African American families in the "central North Side" and
exacerbated racial tensions to block busting, and explained, "[w]hites
felt they had lost property value and were being forced out, and African
Americans felt they were being charged excessively high prices for
property."'
Racially discriminatory practices and increased numbers of southern
black migrants, along with pressures to address the housing needs of
returning World War II veterans, created overcrowded and unsafe
conditions in homes occupied by black residents. 5 The CIO News
reported on a fire in a Sixth Ward lodging house that resulted in the
deaths of two black Army enlistees; other articles noted the death of a
child and the hospitalization of two steelworker's family members as
illustrative of overcrowded, unsafe housing conditions caused by
housing discrimination against black residents. 52 In one article the
reporter declared, "You don't have to go down South to see the
scourges and tragedies caused by segregation, 'restricted' property, and
other forms of discrimination.-The largest city in Wisconsin-our own
Milwaukee-prides itself on being 'debt free' while small children die in

146. Frank P. Zeidler, Some Conditions in Milwaukee at the Time of Brown v. Board of
Education, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 75, 78 (2005).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 78-79.
149. Id. at 79.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 76 (discussing the "severe shortage of housing" in Milwaukee that developed
between 1929 and 1946; observing that housing "for returning veterans was one of the major
issues in the 1948 municipal elections"; describing the increased migration of African
Americans to mostly the Sixth Ward).
152. TROTTER, supra note 48, at 187 (reporting that housing discrimination "caused
blacks to double up in available units").
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the [sixth] ward because of poor housing.'

53

Prior to Brown, housing shortages were so severe that blacks and

whites competed for public housing projects.' In the midst of intense
housing pressures, white residents attempted to use political maneuvers
5 Housing
to prevent black residents from building homes in their area."
discrimination

had

entered

into

the

mix

of

societal

racially

discriminatory transactions contributing to a synergistic matrix of racial
oppression."'
III. WISCONSIN'S REACTIONS TO BROWN

Various shorthand references to the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown often obscure the reality that Brown consists of a collection of
cases. In his discussion of Brown as an icon, Professor Jack Balkin
explains that "in the popular imagination" Brown references are to a
collection of decisions. 7 It is useful to remember Balkin's point when

considering the reactions of Wisconsin's residents to the Brown opinion.
Balkin explains that Brown P158 includes the following cases that
addressed the issue of segregated public schools as violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in Delaware
(Gebhart v. Belton'59 ); Kansas (Brown v. Board of Education"6); South
153. Id. at 187.
154. Id. at 183-84 (describing how white resistance blocked the placement of
Milwaukee's first subsidized housing project, Parklawn, in the predominantly black Sixth
Ward; instead, during August 1937, 418 low income housing units were far beyond the
"northwestern limits of the black community").
155. Id. at 184 (describing how white residents persuaded an alderman to secure passage
of a resolution by the common council that designated forty acres of city land as a
playground; the land had been previously purchased by eighteen black families for building
homes; black protests resulted in the common council rescinding the resolution).
156. C.f Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Business as Usual? Brown and the
Continuing Conundrum of Race in America, in SYMPOSIUM: PROMISES TO KEEP?: BROWN V.
BOARD AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1189
(concluding that social institutions, such as education, housing, family, health care,
employment, and criminal justice, create interlocking systems that perpetuate inequality for
minorities and wealth for whites).
157. JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID
3 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
158. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
159. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952). For a discussion of how the
opinion of the Delaware Court invited the Supreme Court's reversal, see Virginia A. Seitz,
Feature: Chancellor Seitz's Perspective on Brown v. Board of Education, 22 DEL. LAW. 11
(2004).
160. 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
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Carolina (Briggs v. Elliott"'); and Virginia (Davis v. County Board of
Prince Edward County62 ). 163 The collection of cases also includes
Bolling v. Sharpe,16' issued the same day as Brown. However, Bolling
addressed whether the federal government's operation of racially
segregated schools in the District of Columbia violated Fifth
Amendment requirements for due process. Finally, the Brown cases
include the Court's second opinion, Brown H,165 issued on May 31, 1955,
which addressed remedial issues.
The question presented to the Court in Brown I was the following:
"Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of
race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may
be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities?"' 66 In clear terms, the Court answered: "We
believe that it does.' 67 Without expressly referencing Plessy v.
6
Ferguson,1
' the Court concluded, "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' 69has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.'

Reasoning that the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal
protection clause, the Court in Bolling explained that the sources of
concepts of equal protection and due process were American ideals of
fairness.Y
While the concept of "equal protection of the laws"
represented a more explicit safeguard of fairness than "due process of
law," the Court stated that discrimination could be so "unjustifiable" it
violated due process. 7' Explaining further that "liberty" interests were
protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court concluded:
"Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the
deprivation
District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary
172
of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.'

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

98 F. Supp. 529 (D.S.C. 1951).
103 F. Supp. 337 (C.D. Va. 1952).
BALKIN, supra note 157, at 3.
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Id.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
Id.
Id. at 500.
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In Brown II, the Court restated, in broad terms, fundamental
principles set forth in Brown I. In its opening statement the Court
declared that "racial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional. 17 3 The Court added, "All provisions of federal, state,
or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to
this principle.', 74 However, when offering guidance to lower courts with
responsibilities to fashion remedies, the Court concluded that their roles
included reconciling Brown's principles and the rights of individual
parties with countervailing "public interests" and the "varied local
school problems" that could arise during transitions from unlawfully
segregated to constitutionally acceptable school systems.'75 The Court
remanded the cases to the lower courts to "enter such orders and
decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory
basis with all
176
cases.'
these
to
parties
the
speed
deliberate
Responses of African Americans to Brown I demonstrated that the
majority viewed the Supreme Court's opinion as useful for attacking the
full spectrum of racially discriminatory and oppressive practices.
Professor Derrick Bell recalled having similar reactions to Brown I and
states that his beliefs were consistent with the majority of African
Americans.177 While Professor Bell "was on a ship heading home from a
year's military duty in Korea', 78 when he first learned of the Court's
opinion, he remembered that "[n]othing in [his] legal education altered
[his] assumption that the Brown decision marked the
beginning of the
179
end of Jim Crow oppression in all its myriad forms.'
Bell's account of a discussion with Judge William H. Hastie, a civil
rights activist who was later appointed to the federal bench, suggests
Judge Hastie was even more optimistic about the broad impact of the
Court's decision." While in law school, Bell confided to Judge Hastie
that upon graduation, he intended to practice civil rights law.'18 Judge
Hastie responded that "while there might well be some mopping up to
do, the Brown decision had redefined rights to which blacks were
173. Brown, 349 U.S. at 298.
174. Id.

175. Id. at 301.
176. Id. at 301.
177. DERRICK BELL, supra note 2, at 2.

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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'
entitled under the Constitution." 82
Hastie added, "'Son... I am afraid
that you were born fifteen years too late to have a career in civil
rights." ,,' 83
News accounts of reactions to Brown I suggest that initially black
leaders in Milwaukee "distanced the ruling from their local struggles for
civil rights." 1"
Attorney Dale Phillips, President of Milwaukee's
Chapter of the NAACP was reported to have stated that he thought
Brown would help America "'clean up a large section of its own back
yard,"'1 85 with backyard meaning the southern region of the country. A
news article reported that Attorney James Dorsey characterized Brown
as representing a "'tremendous blow to communism,
injecting even
further distance between Milwaukee's problems with racial
discrimination and Brown.'
White local residents also may not have immediately comprehended
the significance of Brown to Milwaukee's civil rights struggles. When
reflecting on public reactions to Brown, Attorney L.C. Hammond,
former defense counsel in the MPS desegregation suit, stated: "While
Brown certainly was a watershed decision insofar as those States or
communities that separated the races in schools by law, at first it was not
considered to have a very significant impact on the rest of the country
that did not have such legislation."' Attorney Irvin B. Charne, former
court-appointed counsel for plaintiffs in the MPS desegregation suit,
offered a similar assessment. Charne stated, "In Milwaukee nothing
happened to implement the [Brown] decision until 1965, when attorney
Lloyd A. Barbee brought a class action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin challenging actions of the
Milwaukee School Board, which he alleged created a segregated school

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 38.

185. Id. at 38 (quoting Dale Phillips, past Milwaukee NAACP president).
186. Id. at 39.
187. Id. at 39 (noting that Dorsey's remarks were caricatured by the Milwaukee Sentinel
in a political cartoon that featured "Uncle Sam delivering a knockout punch to Communist
propagandists"). Dorsey's comments may have been more strategic than distanced from local
civil rights struggles. C.f KLARMAN, supra note 59, at 182-83 (describing how the "Soviet
Union capitalized on American racial atrocities to trumpet the deficiencies of democratic
capitalism" and how black leaders "became adept at using the Cold War imperative for racial
change").
188. Memorandum from L. C. Hammond, Jr. (discussing his perceptions on Brown v.
Board of Education and its progeny) (copy on file with the author).
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system."1 9
Despite initial public declarations and beliefs by some that nothing
occurred in Milwaukee to implement Brown until protests and litigation
to desegregate MPS, some of Milwaukee's black leaders appreciated
and used Brown's legal principles to advance agendas for reforms of
educational, employment, and housing policies. During the late 1950s
William Kelley appropriated Brown's "symbolic value" to renegotiate
the compromise he accepted fifteen years earlier that confined black
teachers to assignments in elementary schools in black neighborhoods."9
Kelley's lobbying and protests against MPS black teacher assignment
policies contributed to significant increases in the numbers of black
teachers employed by MPS (from forty-five in 1954 to 191 in 1960 and
439 by 1965).' ' Further, at Kelley's instigation, MPS officials gradually
began assigning black teachers to work at schools with substantially
white student populations." By 1955, MPS had assigned only two of the
city's forty-five black teachers to schools outside of black
neighborhoods. 93 However, by 1960, of the 191 black teachers working
for MPS, ten worked at schools with "virtually" all white student
populations; by 1965, of the 439 black teachers employed, forty-three
were assigned to schools with predominantly white student
populations.19
By 1957, Attorney James Dorsey demonstrated, through his
representation of black bricklayers in Ross v. Ebert,95 that he believed
the Wisconsin Supreme Court should apply Brown when interpreting
Wisconsin's

legislation

addressing

racial

discrimination

in

employment.196 Dorsey argued to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, albeit
unsuccessfully, that the union's racially discriminatory refusals of
plaintiffs' applications for membership violated the Fourteenth98
197
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court's decision
189. Irvin B. Charne, The Milwaukee Cases, 89 MARQ. L. REv. 83, 83 (2005).
190. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 45.

191. Id. at 47.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 48.
195. 82 N.W.2d 315 (Wis. 1957).
196. Id. at 319-20.
197. Id. (rejecting plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment argument on the grounds of lack of
state action); see also id. at 534 (the dissenting opinion of Justice Fairchild accepting Dorsey's
position):
But there is another reason, in any event, for denying members of a union
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generated such negative publicity that Dorsey and black state
assemblyman Isaac Coggs proposed a bill to strengthen Wisconsin's Fair
Employment Laws, which the legislature passed.' 99
By 1962, Attorney Dorsey had redefined Brown's principles and
applied them in an even broader context. When advocating passage of a
City of Milwaukee Fair Housing Ordinance, Dorsey restated Brown's
concepts in expansive terms: "The court said [in 1954] the doctrine of
equal but separate accommodations for white and negro people had no
place in America ....

Segregation in any form is immoral ....

2

Endemic housing discrimination in Milwaukee had created racially
segregated residential housing patterns that played a role in creating
Milwaukee's racially segregated schools. Attorney Vel Phillips, a
member of the Milwaukee Common Council since 1956, proposed a Fair
Housing Ordinance that would have prohibited discrimination in the
"sale, rental or financing of housing because of race, color, religion or
ancestry., 20 ' Early press accounts have not expressly linked Phillips'
Fair Housing initiatives to Brown's concepts. Nevertheless, they have
established Phillips' appreciation for the relationship between racially
restricted housing practices and the resulting de facto racial segregation
in public schools. Phillips believed that if housing opportunities were
made equally available to black residents, perhaps racially segregated
schools could be avoided. In support of a Fair Housing Ordinance she
proposed for the Common Council's adoption, Phillips set forth as a
"Finding of Fact" the following:
Discrimination in housing results
discrimination and segregation,
segregation in the public schools
facilities, which are prohibited by the

in other forms of
including racial
and other public
constitution of the

the right to exclude people of a different race or creed. Plaintiffs have an
unquestioned constitutional right to equal protection of the laws of this
state. Fourteenth amendment, United States constitution. If it be proved
that defendant union is excluding plaintiffs because of their race, then the
union is denying them the equal protection of the laws of the state
concerning the right of organization and collective bargaining in
employment relations. This is a wrong which a court of equity ought to
prevent.
Id.
198. Ross v. Ebert, 82 N.W.2d 315 (Wis. 1957).
199. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 48.
200. Phillips Housing Plan Rejected in 5-0 Vote, MILWAUKEE J., April 24, 1962.
201. Id.
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United States of America, and are against the laws and
policy of the State of Wisconsin and the City of
Milwaukee.0 2
These assertions brought vehement denials from MPS officials of de
facto segregation. Dr. Dwight Teel, an assistant to the superintendent
of schools, responded that, "there was no segregation in Milwaukee
public schools in the sense the word is used., 20 3 However, carrying his
protests perhaps too far, Dr. Teel inadvertently supported Phillips
claims when he admitted "there are some areas mostly populated by
Negroes with school enrollments predominantly Negro., 2 ' Further, he
explained, "there are areas in which whites reside where mostly white
children attend school."2 5 In an effort to absolve MPS, Dr. Teel
contradicted earlier policy statements MPS officials used to justify black
teacher assignments (MPS officials stated they purportedly assigned
teachers to schools close to their residential locations). Teel stated, "'If
there are areas in which there is segregation, it is because of residential
' 26
locations-not by policy of law or the Milwaukee school system. ' 0
Thus, efforts to address racially discriminatory housing practices,
teacher employment, and teaching assignments created the nascent
foundations upon which Attorney Lloyd Barbee could later construct
theories of unconstitutional racial segregation in Milwaukee's public
schools. Earlier in his career Barbee implicitly acknowledged the
significance of civil rights initiatives that preceded his efforts to integrate
Milwaukee's schools. During 1959, Barbee spoke at the Wisconsin
Education Association convention and urged its predominantly white
audience to support fair employment practices for black educators. 20 7 In
1961, Barbee led a sit-in at the State Capitol for thirteen days in an
unsuccessful attempt to pressure the legislature to pass a state fair
housing bill.2'
When Federal District Judge Irving Kaufman ruled in Taylor v.
202. City School Segregation Charge Denied, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Mar. 15, 1963;
DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 80 (noting that Phillips later clarified her claim of racially
segregated schools stating: "'school segregation does not exist by law, but it does exist in

fact[;].' claiming essentially de facto segregation).
203. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 80.
204. Id.
205. Id.

206. Id.
207. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 75.
208. Id.
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Board of Education209 that the school district had discriminated against

black students by gerrymandering neighborhood school boundaries to
perpetuate racial imbalances and refused citizen requests to correct
racial imbalances, 210 Barbee was "intrigued." 211 By 1962, the NAACP
had embarked upon a program to desegregate schools in Northern as
well as Southern cities.212 By the end of that year, the NAACP had
launched legal action and activism against segregated schools in "sixtynine cities and communities across the North and West." ' As the
former President of the Madison branch of the NAACP and later
President of the state NAACP, Barbee hoped to persuade Milwaukee to
join the Northern school integration movement24
Ultimately, the energy and force of Barbee's commitment succeeded

in directing civil rights initiatives in Milwaukee from pursuing
employment opportunities for black teachers to conforming with
national priorities of the NAACP, 25 achieving integrated schools for
black students. Announcing that the NAACP should not be "accepting

student segregation in exchange for black teachers' jobs," 216 Barbee
embraced Brown's principle that "'separate schools are inherently
unequal.' 12 ' He set out to prove that Milwaukee's black schools offered

black students an inferior education. 8 Despite intra-racial tensions
about its efficacy, integration emerged as the preferred strategy for
ensuring the delivery of a quality education to Milwaukee's black
youth.2 9 Yet, when considering the strategies of Kelley and Barbee,

209. 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
210. Id. at 196-97.
211. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 75.

212. Id. at 76.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 80-81.
215. Balkin, supra note 3, at 1562 (explaining how the NAACP's focus on eliminating
segregation of public facilities and in education reshaped the social movement for African
Americans' civil rights which eventually led to court-ordered busing that mobilized
opponents political resistance against this unpopular judicial remedy).
216. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 80-81.

Dougherty notes that in his memoirs,

Barbee criticized Milwaukee's black leadership as "bogged down" with a "lethargic, apathetic
sense of complacency" and complained that in their efforts to win jobs for black teachers they
"sold out their community to white segregationists," delaying the rise of the integration
movement. Id. at 102.
217. Id. at 84.
218. Id. at 85-87.
219. Id. at 84 (noting how intra-racial divisions formed over the "contested meaning of
all-black schooling and the quality of black teachers employed to work in segregated
systems").
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educational historian Jack Dougherty concludes their "respective
struggles should not be compared head-to-head but understood through
a historical lens, as part of a long line of cumulative,
and sometimes
220
conflicting, movements for black education.,
After attempting to negotiate with MPS officials, Barbee offered
MPS a plan for desegregation, which it declined to adopt. Barbee used
MPS officials' recalcitrance, along with objections to intact busing (i.e.,
busing the African American class and its teacher when school facilities
were too limited, as described in detail below), to mobilize protests and
boycotts of MPS schools.221 Sharon Jackson, an African American
teacher, recalled participating in the "all district boycott" during 1965
while she was a senior attending Milwaukee's Rufus King High
School. 22 The inequities associated with "intact busing" inspired
Jackson to risk truancy sanctions for participating in the school
boycott.2 3 She remembered losing her exemptions from senior
examinations because she was absent from school. 4
Intact busing began during the 1950's as a strategy to address
During 1957, MPS began
overcrowding in inner city schools.22 '
"transporting entire classrooms of elementary students to nearby underenrolled schools, where they were kept intact for the entire day. 226 By
1962, the policy disproportionately affected black students with
crowding increasing in inner city schools and vacancies occurring in
predominantly white schools because of "white flight" to the suburbs. 7
The spectacle of busing black children to white schools and keeping
them separate in some instances for lunch, playground recess, and even
bathroom breaks, offered painful reminders of "separate but unequal"
responses to racial segregation and mobilized hundreds to protest these
policies. 8
Despite the visibility drawn to the problem by the boycott, Barbee

220. Id. at 103.
221. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 95-100 (discussing how intact busing symbolized

"Milwaukee-style segregation" failed negotiations with Milwaukee School Board which left
black residents with the impression that the board members were not interested in the
educational interests of black children led to school boycotts).
222. E-mail from Sharon Jackson to author, supra note 117.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. DOUGHERTY, supra note 86, at 94.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (describing intact busing).
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eventually concluded litigation was the best course of action to bring
about desegregation of MPS schools. During July 1965, Barbee
successfully pursued litigation against MPS in Amos v. Board of School
Directors of the City of Milwaukee,22 9 in the Eastern District of the
Wisconsin federal court.23 ° While settlement of the Amos case led to
limited busing, specialty schools to attract white suburbanites to transfer
to MPS schools, and allotment of funds to permit limited numbers of
black Milwaukee students to attend suburban schools,23' it is generally
agreed that today Milwaukee's schools are more segregated than they
were in 1976.
IV. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM BROWN AND ITS PROGENY

The repeated lesson of Milwaukee's path from the Brown decisions,
through its own court ordered desegregation to the persistent isolation
of inner city poor, shows that the grip of racism is strong. Renewed
vision and rededication to education initiatives have marked Brown's
fiftieth year, with Milwaukee's vitality in the balance.

229. 408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
230. Id.
231. Maxine Aldridge White & Joseph A. Ranney, Lloyd Barbee: Fighting Segregation
"Root and Branch," 77 Wis. LAWYER 14, 58 (April 2004).

